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Abstract. We construct a regulation model in which renegotiation occurs due to the
imperfect enforcement of concession contracts. This enables us to provide theoretical pre-
dictions for the impact, on the probability of renegotiation of a concession, of regulatory
policy, institutional features, economic shocks and of several characteristics of the conces-
sion contracts themselves.
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I. Introduction
Since the late 80s, there has been a huge increase in private participation in
infrastructure, with Latin America leading the way.1 In many cases, private
sector involvement has taken the form of concession contracts, under the
term of which the concessionaire is responsible for the investment in build-
ing or upgrading the necessary infrastructure, and for operating the service,
in exchange for users’ fee.2 According to the World Bank private participa-
tion in infrastructure database, between 1990 and 2000, 65% of the projects
in Latin America and the Caribbean were adjudicated as concessions.3
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1 See for example Harris (2003) and other papers in this issue of the Review of Indus-
trial Organization.
2 See Guasch (2004) for a detailed presentation and discussion of the concession model
and its application in Latin America and the Caribbean.
3 It was 3% for telecommunications, 54% for energy, 89% for water and sanitation, and
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In contrast to outright privatization with transfer of the underlying
assets, in a concession scheme the relevant assets remain property of- and
are transferred back to the state at the end of the contract, which gen-
erally lasts for between 20 and 30 years. While it is beyond doubt that
private participation through concessions has in many cases contributed
to signiﬁcantly improve infrastructure services in the region, there is how-
ever a serious concern with the model, linked to the very high incidence of
renegotiation shortly after their award. Overall, and excluding telecommu-
nications, 41% of infrastructure concessions have been renegotiated. Con-
cerning transportation and water and sanitation, the incidence is 55% and
75% respectively. As for the timing, such renegotiations have taken place
3.1 and 1.6 years after the initial award on average (Guasch, 2004).
In two related companion papers (Guasch, Laffont and Straub, 2003
and 2006), we used a unique data set of around 1,000 privatization pro-
jects in Latin America and the Caribbean to assess the determinants of
these renegotiations. Focusing on transportation and water and sanitation,
the two sectors in which most of the projects are concessions, and the ﬁve
countries (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia and Mexico) in which they
were granted on a regular basis during the 90s, we built a panel includ-
ing the contract characteristics of more than 300 contracts, together with
information concerning the regulatory context, the type of price regulation
in place, the institutional environment of the country, and the evolution of
the economic environment.
The econometric analysis in Guasch, Laffont and Straub (2003) led to
a number of important conclusions concerning the determinants of ﬁrm-
led renegotiations. In a nutshell, we found that the conditions conducive
to renegotiations are a combinations of contract characteristics, regulatory
environment and economic shocks. Speciﬁcally, the main results pointed
to renegotiations being more likely during recessions or after devaluations,
after elections, for concessions awarded before a proper regulatory agency
was put in place, regulated by a price cap, and when the contract included
some type of minimum income guarantee. Furthermore, the existence of
investment was shown to reduce the incidence of renegotiation, while a
worse institutional environment, as captured by an index of bureaucratic
quality, increases it.
The purpose of the present paper is to present a full-ﬂedged theoreti-
cal model, which can account for these empirical regularities.4 We extend
the theoretical framework of Laffont (2003) to develop a model of renego-
tiations at the initiative of ﬁrms, which allows both for Pareto improving
renegotiation due to the incompleteness of contracts, and for rent shifting
renegotiations due to enforcement failures.
4 This model was summarized in reduced form in Guasch et al. (2003).RENEGOTIATION OF CONCESSION CONTRACTS: A THEORETICAL APPROACH 57
In doing so, we model key characteristics of concession contracts and
their environment, such as the power of incentives, the existence of invest-
ment requirements, some speciﬁc clauses like arbitration rules, and exog-
enous economic shock. Moreover, we account for institutional features
(political capture and shifts due to the political cycle, corruption, institu-
tional quality) and for the ﬁnancing structure of the project.
On this last point, we extend the model to account for any combina-
tion of private and public ﬁnancing, and show how this feature, through
its implication on a limited liability constraint of the ﬁrm, makes it possi-
ble to think about aspects of the contracts, such as the incentive strength
of price regulation, that are likely to be endogenous because they induce
both an ex ante self-selection and an ex post moral hazard effect.
Related Literature
The literature on regulation and procurement contracts under asymmet-
ric information (Baron and Myerson, 1982; Laffont and Tirole, 1993) has
traditionally assumed complete contracting. In this framework, it is well
known that while limitations on the regulator’s commitment not to renego-
tiate may lead to the ratchet effect, in which the ﬁrm prefers to strategically
withhold its information, renegotiation never happens (Dewatripont, 1986;
Hart and Tirole, 1988; Laffont and Tirole, 1990). Indeed, the anticipated
outcome of a potential renegotiation is anticipated in the initial contract,
which is then renegotiation-proof.
It therefore appears that to have actual renegotiations along the equi-
librium path, some degree of contractual incompleteness is needed (Hart
and Moore, 1988; Green and Laffont, 1992; Aghion Dewatripont and Rey
1994; Segal and Whinston, 2002). Several ad hoc reasons for this incom-
pleteness may be considered, among which contractual transaction costs,
bounded rationality of the contracting parties, or imperfections of the
judicial system (Tirole, 1999).
On this last point, note that the Chicago school has long stressed
the importance of the enforcement of laws (Becker, 1968; Stigler, 1970;
Becker and Stigler, 1974; Posner, 1972; Polinsky and Shavell, 2000, offer a
recent synthesis). There has been little contact however, between this tradi-
tion and modern contract theory. Recently, Laffont (2003) put forward a
regulation model with asymmetric information, in which a costly invest-
ment in enforcement, akin to the black box tradition of the Chicago
school, determines the probability of enforcement of the initial contract.
Section 2 presents the basic model, extending the framework of laffont
and Tirole (1993) and Laffont (2003) to account for imperfect enforce-
ment and renegotiation. Section 3 introduces institutional constraints such
as corruption and political capture. Section 4 models the ﬁnancing struc-
ture of the project and limited liability. Section 5 concludes.58 J. LUIS GUASCH ET AL.
II. The Model
1. OPTIMAL REGULATION UNDER COMPLETE INFORMATION
To model the concession of a natural monopoly, we start from the Laffont
and Tirole (1993) regulation model. The ﬁrm has a variable cost function:
C=(β −e)q, (1)
where q is the production level, β is a cost parameter, which is private








= ν, and e is an
effort variable of the ﬁrm which decreases cost, but creates to the manager
a disutility   (e) with   >0,    >0,     ≥0. Additionally, there is a sunk
investment, or ﬁxed cost, F, which is common knowledge.
Denoting p(.) the inverse demand function and ˆ t the transfer from the
regulator to the ﬁrm, the ﬁrm’s net utility is given by:
U = ˆ t +p(q)q −(β −e)q−F −  (e). (2)
Assuming that cost is observable ex post by the regulator as well as
the price and the quantity, we make the accounting assumption that rev-
enues and cost are incurred by the regulator, who then pays a net transfer
t = ˆ t +p(q)q−(β −e)q−F to the ﬁrm.
Normalizing the utility of the outside opportunity to zero for each type
of ﬁrm, its participation constraint can therefore be written:
U =t −  (e)=t −  (β −c)≥0, (3)
where we make use of (1) to substitute e by β −c, with c= C
q .
Consumers derive utility S (q), S  >0, S   <0 from the consumption of
the natural monopoly’s good. To ﬁnance the transfer ˆ t, the government
must raise taxes with a price of public funds 1+λ, λ>0. Hence, consum-
ers’ net utility is:
V =S (q)−p(q)q −(1+λ) ˆ t. (4)
Utilitarian social welfare is then the sum of consumers’ surplus and the
ﬁrm utility:
  W =U +V
=S (q)+λp (q)q −(1+λ)((β −e)q +F +  (e))−λU. (5)
The use of an equal weight of 1 for both implies that the government
values the rent of the ﬁrm as much as consumers’ utility, which may not be
the case if the awarded concessionaire is a foreign ﬁrm. However, as long
as the weight of the ﬁrm’s rent in social welfare is lower that 1+λ, the reg-
ulator dislikes leaving a rent to the ﬁrm (−λU in (5)). In subsequent sec-
tions, we analyze the effect of making this weight vary.RENEGOTIATION OF CONCESSION CONTRACTS: A THEORETICAL APPROACH 59



















This solution has the following has the following properties:
- (6), which says that social marginal utility equals social marginal cost,
can be rewritten as a Lerner index formula, using the fact that consumers













where η(p) is the price elasticity of demand. This shows that the price lies




- The marginal disutility of effort   (e) is equated to its marginal social
gain q (7).
- No rent is given up to the ﬁrm (8), because funds are socially costly
(λ>0).
2. ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION
From now on, we assume that the regulator observes neither the effort level
e nor the cost parameter β. From equation (3) it can be seen that the
observability of cost implies that we are in a “false moral hazard setting”,
which collapses to a simple adverse selection problem6.
From the Revelation Principle, there is no loss of generality in restrict-









ify for each message ˜ β =β or ˜ β =β an average cost to achieve and a net
transfer from the regulator. The regulatory contract also recommends a
production level q (or q) and a total cost C (or C), compatible with c (or
c) (between which the ﬁrm is indifferent).
This direct revelation mechanism must satisfy the incentive constraints:


















5 Appropriate assumptions on S (.) ensure that W is strictly concave in (q,e). See






the complete information solutions corresponding to
β and β respectively.
6 See Laffont and Martimort (2002).60 J. LUIS GUASCH ET AL.
where U (resp. ¯ U) represents at a truthful equilibrium the rent of type β
(resp. ¯ β).
These constraints can be rewritten:
U ≥ U + (e) (11)





where  (e)≡  (e)−  (e− β),   >0,    >0.
To make the presentation of the renegotiation process as simple as
possible, we start by assuming that the regulator offers a contract to the
ﬁrm before the latter discovers its type (see Figure 1 for the timing).
In this case, the ﬁrm must accept or reject the contract before knowing
its type, so its participation constraint must be written ex ante:
νU+(1−ν)U ≥0. (13)
However, as we discuss at the end of this section and in the section on
outside ﬁnancing and limited liability below, renegotiation may still happen
when the ﬁrm is protected by a limited liability constraint, which in effect
makes the model similar to a standard ex post contracting setting.
Giventheassumptionsabove,theregulator’smaximizationprogramisnow:
max





















S (q)+λp (q)q −(1+λ)
 






s.t. (11) (12) (13).
For convenience, we rewrite this program in terms of the variables
(q,e,U) rather than (q,c,U),denoting W (q,e,β) the complete informa-
tion ex post social welfare for a production level q and an effort level e
when the efﬁciency parameter is β, i.e.:
W (q,e,β)=S (q)+λp (q)q −(1+λ)((β −e)q +F +  (e)). (14)
The regulator’s program becomes:
max




























The firm accepts 
or not the 
contract
Time
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To solve this program, the regulator makes the participation constraint
binding, substitutes it in the objective function, and maximizes social wel-
fare.7 For each value of β he obtains the complete information optimum.
Note that while there are many pairs of transfers that structure the rents in
such a way that the incentive constraints are satisﬁed, the inefﬁcient type
¯ β’s ex post utility is always negative.8
Given this negative ex post utility, the issue of enforcement arises, since
once it discovers its type β the ﬁrm will want to renege on the regula-
tory contract. It make sense to think that in a country that has previously
invested in building strong institutions, as may be the case for developed
countries, the contract will nevertheless be enforced in both states of nature
β and β. Then, the complete information optimal allocation is achieved
despite the setting of incomplete information and asymmetric information
does not create any transaction cost for society.
At the other extreme, consider the case in which the regulator knows
that he will not be automatically able to enforce a negative ex post util-
ity level for the ﬁrm, for example because the judicial system is deﬁ-
cient. He will then choose a regulatory contract, which maximizes expected
social welfare under the incentive constraints and the ex post participation
constraints:9
U ≥ 0 (15)
U ≥ 0. (16)
The set of constraints makes the contract similar to one offered to the
ﬁrm at the interim stage, i.e. once the ﬁrm has learned its type. It is well
known that in this case the efﬁcient type’s incentive constraint (11) and
the inefﬁcient type’s participation constraint (16) will be the binding ones.
Substituting into the objective function of the regulator and maximizing,
we obtain:







   
eSB 
(17)







and the same pricing equations as under complete information10.
7 See Laffont and Martimort (2002).
8 This loss is minimized when (11) is binding.
9 We assume here that production is so valuable that shut-down of the inefﬁcient type
is not an interesting option.
10 This is due to the fact that the cost function satisﬁes the separability assumption
C (q,h(β,e)) which implies the dichotomy property, i.e. the absence of incentive correc-
tion in the pricing formula (see Laffont and Tirole, 1993).62 J. LUIS GUASCH ET AL.
Now, the efﬁcient type captures a positive rent and, to decrease some-
what this socially costly rent, the regulator decreases the effort level in the
case β =β, while the efﬁcient type’s effort level is not distorted.
3. IMPERFECT ENFORCEMENT
The possibility that institutions ensure only an imperfect enforcement of
regulatory contracts opens the question of what happens when ex post the
ﬁrm seeks the renegotiation of the initial deal. We assume that whenever its
ex post utility level after renegotiation is higher than the utility level speci-
ﬁed in the contract, a ﬁrm attempts to renegotiate. In practice, this is sim-
ilar to consider the case in which the ﬁrm obtains an ex post utility lower
than its status-quo payoff (U<0).11
In the absence of strong institutions, preventing renegotiation requires
that the regulator invests in some costly mechanism. We model this by
assuming that with probability π (x), which depends on the expenses x
incurred to ﬁnance the functioning of the enforcement mechanism, the reg-
ulator is able nevertheless to impose the implementation of the agreed
upon contract. We assume that π (0)=0, limx→∞π (x)=1, πx >0, πxx<0.
Therefore, with probability 1 − π (x) the regulator is forced to accept
a renegotiation, which we model using the Nash bargaining solution but
assuming that renegotiation is costly, for example because it takes time. We
introduce a parameter δ∈(0,1) to model this cost of renegotiation, so that
the level of social welfare resulting from renegotiation is δW (q,e,β).
The status quo payoffs, in case negotiation fails, are respectively
U0=−F for the ﬁrm, which loses its ﬁxed cost, and W0=−H for the reg-
ulator, where H captures a loss of reputation. Below, we make appropri-
ate assumptions so that the efﬁcient type ﬁrm never wants to renege on its
contract. Costly bargaining then takes place under complete information,





















































so that the ﬁrm and the regulator share equally the social surplus.
11 We are considering values of parameters where it is better for the regulator to accept
the possibility of renegotiation than to give up such large rents in the initial contract so
that no type of ﬁrm wants to renegotiate.RENEGOTIATION OF CONCESSION CONTRACTS: A THEORETICAL APPROACH 63
Of course, we still need to consider the fact that, anticipating the out-
come of the renegotiation, the regulator modiﬁes ex ante the contract it
offers. Let us denote by U1 andU1 the modiﬁed rents.
When the ﬁrm discovers to be of type β, so that its ex post utility will
be negative, it tries to force a renegotiation. With probability π(x) it faces
tough enforcement and is forced to carry on with the project despite this
negative utility, while with probability 1−π(x), it succeeds and renegotia-
tion happens.
Moreover, in this last case, we assume that with some (small) positive
probability P the parties fail to reach an agreement and the status quo
payoffs are implemented. This echoes the fact that empirically renegotia-
tions fail in approximately 10% of the cases.12 Technically, this ensures that
variables entering the statu quo payoffs will have an impact on the ex post
probability of renegotiation. An alternative method would be to assume
that the pre-renegotiation utilities U and U are affected by some non-antic-
ipated random shock. Since this makes the model more complex without
qualitatively modifying the results, we do not pursue this line.































which still needs to be incentive compatible (conditions (11) and (12)).
Maximizing this objective function by making again the participation
12 See Guasch, Laffont and Straub (2006).













=(1−ν)(1−π (x))(1−P);P r (U =−F)=(1−ν)(1−π (x))P. The choice of
the new levels of rent U1 and U1 is not unique and must be made in such a way that
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constraint binding, we get:
qE =q∗;eE =e∗ (24)















The probability of renegotiation is then given by:
Pr(renegotiation)=(1−ν)(1−π(xE)) (27)
which clearly depends on xE, the investment in enforcement.
As mentioned above, the regulator invests to build an enforcement
institution because the social welfare obtained by the initial contract for









), or because renegotiation may fail. This enforcement mecha-
nism is imperfect and its quality is determined by (26), and decreases (and
therefore the probability of renegotiation increases) with the efﬁciency of ex
post bargaining δ.14
Note that the effect on social welfare W(q∗,e∗,β) of an increase in the
cost of public funds λ depends on the sign of revenue net of cost (p(q)
q −((β −e)q+F +ψ(e))). It is increasing in λ if net revenues are positive,
i.e. the industry is used as a source of public funds, and decreasing in λ in
the other case. In the second case, which holds in general for the water and
transportation industries, the net effect of an increase in λ is to decrease
enforcement.15
Also, because any rent resulting from ex post renegotiation is captured
ex ante in the contract offered by the regulator, there is no change in the
power of incentives, which is not intermediary between what is obtained
with perfect enforcement (high powered) and self-enforcing contracts (low
powered).
Finally, note that if the enforcement mechanism is not very efﬁcient
and/or the probability that renegotiation fails is not so small, it could be
that the optimal solution obtained above is dominated by self-enforcing
contracts.16
14 This parameter can be related to arbitration rules, which are meant to
help settle disputes, thereby making renegotiation less costly. Therefore, we would
thus expect the existence of formal arbitration rules (higher δ ) to increase the
probability of renegotiation.
15 The effect through PλF can be neglected for P small.
16 See Laffont (2003) for the relevant conditions and discussion.RENEGOTIATION OF CONCESSION CONTRACTS: A THEORETICAL APPROACH 65
4. SHOCKS
A simple way to introduce shocks in our framework is to assume the
possibility of an unanticipated shock ε that shifts the distribution of ﬁrm’s
types, so that they become {ν+ε,1−ν−ε}. Such a noise is a shortcut to
model a shock affecting either cost or demand of the ﬁrms and to take into
account Pareto improving renegotiations due to unanticipated events.
The probability or renegotiation then becomes:
Pr(renegotiation)=(1−ν−ε)(1−π(xE)), (28)
which decreases as ε increases. Thus, positive shocks, such as an increase
in demand or a favorable shift in relative prices of inputs or outputs,
reduce the probability of renegotiation, while negative shocks (decrease in
demand, cost shock) increase it.17
III. Institutional constraints
Institutional constraints in host countries obviously affect the incidence
of renegotiation in concession contracts. In what follows, we introduce in
different ways these institutional dimensions in the regulatory contract,
focusing speciﬁcally on politics, corruption and rule of law.
1. POLITICS AND STATE CAPTURE
A simple way to model the incidence of political considerations in the
occurrence of renegotiations, is to assume that the government is more or
less captured by the ﬁrm’s stakeholders and overweights or underweights
the ﬁrm’s utility in social welfare18. Thus, the maximization program con-
sists of a weighted sum of consumers’ surplus and the utility of the ﬁrm:
W =V +γU,
where γ may actually be greater than 1. We simply need to assume, for an
interior solution to hold, that γ<1+λ, so that the regulator always wants
to minimize and not maximize the ﬁrm’s rent. A value of γ higher than 1
is thus the sign that the interests of the ﬁrm and the government are more
aligned, i.e. of a higher degree of state capture by the ﬁrm’s stakeholders.
A value of γ less than 1 is a sign that the government is partially captured
by the non-stakeholders of the ﬁrm.
17 Admittedly, this is a very particular way of extending the model to account for rene-
gotiations due to unexpected events.
18 See Laffont (2000).66 J. LUIS GUASCH ET AL.
Solving the same maximization problem as before, we get a value of
U
E
deﬁned by equation (21), where at the denominator λ is replaced by
















What are the effects of an increase in γ, i.e. of a higher degree of state
capture on the probability of renegotiation? From (29), it can be seen that
it decreases the equilibrium level of enforcement, which implies more rene-
gotiation. When γ increases, the cost of giving up a rent decreases. Sup-
pose ﬁrst that renegotiation never fails (P = 0). Then this lower cost of
the rent has no effect because ex ante contracting enables the regulator to
capture this rent. However, if, as we have assumed, politicians do not incur
losses when renegotiation fails, the level of capture does not affect social
welfare when renegotiation fails. As γ increases, the cost of the rent (when
there is no renegotiation or when renegotiation succeeds) decreases. From
the ﬁrm’s participation constraint, it implies that the social cost of losing
the sunk cost F when renegotiation fails decreases as well. It is relatively
less costly to provoke renegotiation (because the regulator is relatively less
concerned by failure of negotiation) and therefore the level of enforcement
decreases. In a dynamic framework, changes of the majority may corre-
spond to shifts in the value of γ. Empirically, we would thus expect the
probability of renegotiation to be affected by the results of recent elections.
Additionally, we can also expect the existence of a regulator at the time of
signing the contract to result in better contracts that would limit the scope
for subsequent political capture.
2. RULE OF LAW OR CORRUPTION
We assume now that the probability of enforcing the agreed upon contract
takes the form θπ(x), where the parameter θ stands for the quality of the
rule of law or of the bureaucracy, i.e. of the existing “stock” of institutions,
or represent an alternative way of modeling the degree of political capture
when regulators or politicians can be bribed.















so that better rule of law or less corruption increases the investment in
enforcement.
The direct effect of an increase in θ is thus to decrease the probability
of renegotiation, since it decreases the relative cost of enforcing the initialRENEGOTIATION OF CONCESSION CONTRACTS: A THEORETICAL APPROACH 67
contract. Thus, we expect that in environments characterized by better rule
of law or less corruption there will be less renegotiations.
IV. Outside Financing and Limited Liability
Consider now the case where the ﬁrm is protected by limited liability.
However, the ﬁrm owns assets, which can be used as collateral if it incurs
some debt. The sunk investment has to be made before producing, and
ﬁnancing may take two forms. First, the ﬁrm must rely on bank ﬁnancing
but should be guaranteed enough proﬁt to pay back the loan.19 Second, if
private ﬁnancing is insufﬁcient, the government may ﬁnance it. Of course,
any combination of these two cases is also possible. Let us introduce the
following notations:
A denotes the ﬁrm’s assets needed for the project.
F is the necessary additional sunk investment.
K is the amount ﬁnanced by banks’ loans (K ∈[0,F]), so that K =0
implies complete government ﬁnancing, while K =F corresponds to totally
private ﬁnancing. The interest rate on this loan is r.
As the ﬁrm has to repay K, its utility level is now:
U = ˆ t +p(q)q −(β −e)q−(1+r)K−  (e). (31)
Moreover, since the bank must be repaid, the ﬁrm must have a non neg-
ative utility:20
U ≥0.
This limited liability constraint ensures that the bank is always paid
back. To simplify the analysis, we thus consider that the regulator takes
this constraint into account in his program and does not include the bank’s
welfare in social welfare. A further justiﬁcation is that the bank may be a
foreign bank with respect to which default is not affordable.
Since the government ﬁnances only F −K, at the cost of public fund λ,
the equivalent of (14) becomes:
W (q,e,β)=S (q)+λp (q)q −(1+λ)((β −e)q +F +rK+  (e)). (32)
Note that the level of K will affect the status quo payoff of the gov-
ernment in case of renegotiation. In what follows, we will assume that
19 Here, we simplify the analysis by excluding renegotiations with the bank itself. It
allows us to consider the bank’s interest rate as exogenous.
20 We could specify this limited liability constraint on ﬁnancial ﬂows ˆ t + p(q)
q−(β−e)q−(1+r)K≥0. This would introduce more regimes to consider in the program
of the regulator below.68 J. LUIS GUASCH ET AL.
A<F, so that the ﬁrm is able to repay only a share of its debt in case of
failure21. Two subcases arise. If K<A , the bank gets K and the govern-
ment gets the remainder A − K that covers part of its investment F −
K, leaving a net loss F −A. The status quo payoffs of the ﬁrm and the
government are respectively:
(−A,−H −F +A).
If K>A , the bank gets only A while the government gets nothing, so it
loses F −K. Payoffs are then:
(−A,−H −F +K).
These two cases can be summarized, by noting that the status quo
payoffs are:
(−A,−H −F +max(K,A)). (33)
With the possibility of renegotiation and the disagreement point now











So, private ﬁnancing costs more than public ﬁnancing, but it increases
the status quo payoff of the regulator and therefore its bargaining power
in the renegotiation. Accordingly, the outcome of renegotiation for the ﬁrm
decreases with K. Similarly it decreases (resp. increases) with F if δ(1 +
λ)>1 (resp. δ(1+λ)<1). Note that the outcome of renegotiation for the
regulator unambiguously decreases with F.
The program becomes then:
max

























+(1−ν)(1−π(x))P [−H −F +max(K,A)]−(1+λ)x (35)
21 Were we to consider the case A>F, the ﬁrm’s assets would cover the total losses
in case of renegotiation failure. The bank would get K and the government F −K, and














The binding constraints are the limited liability constraint of the bad
type (40) and either the incentive constraint of the good type (37) or the
participation constraint (36). These two constraints can be summarized by















Noticing that now renegotiation happens only if U
E
≥ 0, and assum-
ing that P is small, the second term in parenthesis is negative, so only the
incentive constraint (37) is binding (U1= (e)). Substituting the values of
U1,U1 and U
E
























+(1−ν)(1−π(x))P [−H −F +max(K,A)]−(1+λ)x. (41)
The effort and output levels of the bad type are now distorted because
an expected rent is given up to the ﬁrm:








xL    
eL 
. (42)
The presence of the term π
 
xL 
at the denominator implies a stronger











2 )[δW(q∗,e∗,β)+H+F−max(K,A)]−(1−P)λA. (43)70 J. LUIS GUASCH ET AL.
What is the effect of variations in F and K on the probability of rene-
gotiation? From the denominator of (43), and taking into account the pres-








This ﬁrst effect is due to the combined effect that an increase of
K increases cost (and therefore decreases the gain from avoiding rene-
gotiation) and improves the regulator’s bargaining power22 and therefore




This second effect is also due to the fact that an increase F increases
cost.23 Although it also decreases the bargaining power of the regulator,
this cost effect dominates.24
It makes sense, however, to take into account the potential incentive
effect of the limited liability constraint. Since the expected utility of the
ﬁrm is now strictly positive, it has incentives to invest to increase its
expected proﬁt. We model this by assuming that with expenses i (ν) (i (ν)>
0,i  (ν)≥0) the ﬁrm increases the probability that β =β. Then, it chooses













We assume for simplicity that the ﬁrm does not take into account the









Therefore, everything that decreases (resp. increases) the ﬁrm’s bargain-
ing power and therefore the utility from renegotiation increases (resp.
decreases) its incentive for investment and therefore decreases (resp.
increases) the probability of renegotiation.
From the expression of U
E
we see that, through this effect, if F
increases, either the probability of renegotiation increases (case δ(1+λ)<1)
22 Note that if renegotiation was involving the bank it would remain true that an
increase of K which weakens the bank’s position should improve the bargaining power
of the regulator.
23 We have neglected the fact that xL enters (42) so that there is a feedback effect as






. This reinforces the effect on x.








2 (−δ(1+λ)+1)<0. This can be
rewritten (1+λ)(1+δP)>
1+P
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which reinforces the direct effect, or it decreases (case δ(1+λ)>1). On the
other hand, an increase in K decreases the probability of renegotiation.
Overall, more investment unambiguously increases the probability of
renegotiation if δ(1+λ)<1 and has an ambiguous effect otherwise. More
private ﬁnancing always has an ambiguous effect.
We can now revisit our previous discussion on the power of incentives.
With limited liability, it is now clear from (42) and (43) that it is deter-
mined simultaneously with the level of enforcement. From (43), the higher
incentives, the higher the probability of renegotiation. However, as dis-
cussed above, any clauses of the concession potentially affecting the out-
come of a renegotiation should be considered as endogenous. In the case of
the strength of incentives, the fact that a regulatory mechanism is chosen
for several periods is crucial. By creating more risky revenues in the future,
a high powered mechanism such as price cap increases the probability of
renegotiation. On the other hand, it will also be chosen by more efﬁcient
ﬁrms, because these will be residual claimant of their cost savings between
regulatory reviews. The ﬁnal qualitative impact of the regulatory scheme is
therefore theoretically ambiguous.
V. Conclusion
We have built a theoretical model, which predictions are broadly consistent
with the empirical results in Guasch, Laffont and Straub (2003). Extending
a standard regulation model to account for the imperfect enforcement of
contracts, we get that the main aspects positively affecting the probability
of renegotiation are a higher cost of public fund λ, a higher degree of state
capture γ, negative economic shocks, the existence of arbitration rules as
captured by the parameter δ, and worse institutional quality (through our θ
variable representing rule of law, non-corruption, or the quality of bureau-
cracy).
On the other hand, we have several variables for which the theoretical
effect is ambiguous. This is the case of the strength of incentives, the extent
of investment and the degree of private ﬁnancing, which effect is ultimately
an empirical matter.
As stressed in the introduction, renegotiations in this model should be
thought of as initiated by the ﬁrms. Indeed, government-led renegotiations
would present a different theoretical challenge, since the possibility of stra-
tegic ex post actions on the side of the principal (here the regulator), would
modify ﬁrms’ optimal behavior and open the possibility of a ratchet effect.
This issue is addressed at the theoretical and empirical level in Guasch,
Laffont and Straub (2006).72 J. LUIS GUASCH ET AL.
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